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Dialectical self-thinking involves holding the view that one can possess contradictory
traits such as extraverted and introverted. Prior work has demonstrated that the dorsal
part of anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) plays a crucial role in conflict monitoring as
well as self-related processing. Here, we tested the function of dACC in dialectical self-
thinking using a modified classical self-referential paradigm (self- vs. other-referential
thinking), in which participants had to make a judgment whether a simultaneously
presented pair of contradictory or non-contradictory traits properly described them
while brain activity was recording using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
The data showed that activity in the dACC during the processing of self-relevant
conflicting information was positively correlated with participants’ dispositional level
of naïve dialecticism (measured with the Dialectical Self Scale). Psychophysiological
interaction (PPI) analyses further revealed increased functional connectivity between the
dACC and the caudate, middle temporal gyrus and hippocampus during the processing
of self-relevant conflicting information for dialectical thinkers. These results support the
hypothesis that the dACC has a key role in dialectical self-thinking.
Keywords: naïve dialecticism, dialectical self-thinking, trait-judgment, functional magnetic resonance imaging,
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
INTRODUCTION
Humans live in a world that can be full of contradiction. One strategy for dealing with
contradictory information that has a long history in philosophy, but a relatively short history
in psychology, is so-called ‘dialectical thinking.’ Piaget (1974) described dialectical thinking
as the most sophisticated mental operation, extending far beyond formal operations in the
development of thought processes. Dialectical thinking has been studied in a range of contexts,
from assessments of personal beliefs about the world (ontologies) through to beliefs about
the nature of knowledge (epistemologies; e.g., Basseches, 1979, 1984). Peng and Nisbett (1999)
proposed three characteristics of naïve dialecticism: (i) the principle of change: everything is in
constant dynamic ﬂux; (ii) the principle of contradiction: contradiction exists everywhere, and
contradictory aspects can coexist in the same thing; and (iii) the principle of relationships or holism:
nothing is isolated, and all things are connected.
Previous studies in dialectical thinking have demonstrated the eﬀect of naïve dialecticism in
various cognitive domains, such as perception, attention, self-processing, emotion, and attribution
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judgments (Peng and Nisbett, 1999; Nisbett et al., 2001; Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2010). In these studies, East Asians have been
more likely to manifest a dialectical thinking style compared with
North Americans, for example, in making attributions (Morris
and Peng, 1994; Choi and Nisbett, 1998), in reasoning about
contradiction (Peng and Nisbett, 1999), and in predicting change
(Ji et al., 2001). When reﬂecting personality traits in reference
to the self, Chinese individuals are more likely to judge that
pairs of contradictory traits (e.g., ‘extraverted’ and ‘introverted’)
ﬁt with themselves, while Americans are more likely to judge that
only one of the pair can properly describe themselves (Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2004, 2009; Boucher et al., 2009). It should be noted
that, although the concept of naïve dialecticism originated from
cross-cultural research, it can also be measured as an individual
diﬀerence variable within a single cultural group (English and
Chen, 2007; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004, 2009), or be temporally
manipulated using priming (Ma-Kellams et al., 2011).
Although the phenomenon of dialectical thinking has been
well-established in social and cultural psychology and supported
by a good deal of behavioral data, it remains unknown which
brain region(s) govern this speciﬁc thinking style. In the current
study, we focus on the manifestation of dialectical thinking in the
domain of the self and attempt to identify the neural basis of this
thought process. This investigation allowed us to assess how the
brain responds to contradictory personality traits associated with
ourselves compared with other people using a dialectical thinking
style.
There are two lines of neuroscience literature that are relevant
to the current investigation. Firstly, neuroimaging studies in
the ﬁeld of self-related processing have consistently shown that
self-referential thinking, such as evaluating personality traits in
relation to the self (e.g., deciding whether personality traits such
as ‘kind’ properly describe oneself), is associated with increased
activity in the cortical midline structures such as ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
compared to when similar evaluations are made to others (Craik
et al., 1999; Northoﬀ and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoﬀ et al., 2006;
Zhu et al., 2007; Chiao et al., 2009, 2010; Denny et al., 2012;
Ma et al., 2014). In addition to the cortical midline structures,
a widely distributed set of regions has also been linked with
various aspects of self-related processing. For example, activity
in the caudate has been suggested to reﬂect the rewarding aspects
of the self (Enzi et al., 2009); the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(VLPFC) is involved in the retrieval of self-related semantic
memory (Martinelli et al., 2013), while the hippocampus is
implicated in self-related episodic memory (Svoboda et al., 2006;
Addis et al., 2012). In addition, the anterior insula is associated
with interoceptive self-awareness (Craig, 2009), and the fusiform
gyrus with self-face recognition (Platek et al., 2008; Ma and Han,
2012). However, the neural basis of the dialectical aspect of the
self has not been examined.
Secondly, prior work in the ﬁeld of conﬂict processing has
reported that the dorsal part of the ACC (dACC) plays a key
role in monitoring and resolving conﬂict during information
processing (Botvinick et al., 2004; Carter and van Veen, 2007).
For example, the dACCwas activated in conﬂict detection (Carter
et al., 1999; Carter et al., 2000; MacDonald et al., 2000), in
resolution of conﬂicting responses in Stroop-like tasks (Posner
and DiGirolamo, 1998), and in focusing attention on task-
relevant stimuli while ignoring task-irrelevant stimuli (Weissman
et al., 2005). In recent years, the dACC has also been linked with
dealing with conﬂict in higher-level processes such as resolving
cognitive dissonance (van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2010;
Jarcho et al., 2011). In addition to the dACC, other attention-
related regions have also been found to be involved in conﬂict-
processing, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
and the parietal cortex (Luks et al., 2007; Stern et al., 2007; Roberts
and Hall, 2008). Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether the
dACC is critical to monitor and resolve conﬂicting information
in self-referential thinking.
Dialectical self-thinking, by its deﬁnition, is a special form of
self-referential thinking that deals with conﬂicting information
in the domain of the self. Since both self-thinking and conﬂict-
processing have been repeatedly linked to the ACC, in particular
its dorsal part, we propose that the dACC is critical too in
dialectical self-thinking. One key feature of naïve dialecticism
is that individuals possessing a dialectical thinking style do
not only passively accept the existence of contradiction and
leave it as it is, but also try to compromise the contradictory
aspects, reorganizing and integrating them into a cohesive whole
(Peng and Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004). For
example, when facing social contradictions, Chinese individuals
prefer dialectical resolutions (e.g., addressing the issues from
both sides and reconciling the conﬂict by compromising) over
non-dialectical resolutions (e.g., ﬁnding exclusive fault with one
side; Peng and Nisbett, 1999, Study 2). Furthermore, Chinese
participants who read about two contradictory studies, compared
to those who read about only one of the studies, express
more beliefs that are intermediate across both studies (Peng
and Nisbett, 1999, Study 5). Lastly, in the domain of the
self, compared to European Americans, Japanese participants
have been shown to exhibit higher simultaneous accessibility
to contradictory self-aspects while maintaining similar levels of
processing speed, indicating that they were not less uncertain
about self in general (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009, Study 2).
Although previous research on the dACC mostly focused on the
non-dialectical approach of conﬂict resolution (i.e., accepting one
side of the contradiction and rejecting the other), this dialectical
approach requires even more continuous exposure to and deeper
processing of both sides of the contradiction and integrating them
at amore holistic level. Thus, we predicted that chronic dialectical
thinkers would be more likely to utilize the dACC, which is
involved in conﬂict-processing as well as self-processing, to
incorporate conﬂicting information about oneself into a cohesive
self-concept.
To test this hypothesis, we employed a modiﬁed version of
the well-established self-referential thinking paradigm (Zhu et al.,
2007; Chiao et al., 2009, 2010). In our paradigm, participants
were presented a pair of personality traits (contradictory vs. non-
contradictory pairs) and had to judge whether the pair described
themselves or a public ﬁgure (self vs. other-referential thinking).
During the task, brain activity was recorded by functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants’ level of naïve
dialecticism was measured as a dispositional construct with
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the Dialectical Self Scale (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004).
We predicted that the dACC would be more active for
chronic dialectical thinkers during the processing of self-relevant
conﬂicting information. Furthermore, their dACC would play
a more central role in their self-processing network and
modulate activity in other nodes, resulting in increased functional
coupling between the dACC and functionally linked regions
during self-related conﬂict processing. This prediction was
assessed using psychophysiological interactions (PPI) analysis
(Friston et al., 1997) which examines the relative changes of
functional connectivity between brain regions across the diﬀerent
experimental conditions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-seven Chinese college students (16 females; 19–30 years
old, mean ± SD = 22.30 ± 2.35) participated in the experiment.
All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Informed consent was obtained from all
participants prior to the experiment according to procedures
approved by the ethics committee of Center for Biomedical
Imaging Research, Tsinghua University.
Stimuli
We created a list of 428 traits adjectives based on previously
used personality traits pools (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Zhang
et al., 2006; Zhu et al., 2007). Among them, 128 pairs of traits
were chosen based on the level of contradiction in meaning and
valences rated by six Chinese and six American participants.
These traits were classiﬁed into 16 groups, and two versions of
4-pair subsets were created for each group. In the contradictory
version, the original trait pairs that were contradictory inmeaning
as well as in valence were retained (e.g., intelligent-stupid).1 In
non-contradictory versions, traits were re-paired with another
trait in the same group such that the new pairs were non-
contradictory in meaning and had similar valence (e.g., stupid –
untrustworthy). Sixteen contradictory subsets were used for the
contradictory condition and 16 non-contradictory pairs for the
non-contradictory condition, and were counter-balanced across
conditions and participants.
Procedure
Participants performed trait-judgment tasks in relation to the
self or to a well-known public ﬁgure (i.e., Hu Jintao, who
was the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China at the
time). The stimuli were presented through an LCD projector
onto a rear projection screen at the head end of the bore
of the scanner. Participants viewed the screen through an
angled mirror positioned attached above the head-coil. During
1In previous studies, both contradiction in trait meaning (e.g., Spencer-Rodgers
et al., 2009, Study 2) and contradiction in valence (e.g., Spencer-Rodgers et al.,
2004, Study 1) have been used to operationally deﬁne of the dialectical self. This
was partly reﬂects the fact that contradiction in meaning and valence are neutrally
confounded (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). In the current study, these two factors
were bound together to represent the higher-level construct of the dialectical self.
each scan, participants had to make judgments on whether
pairs of traits correctly described either him/her (the self
condition) or the public (the other condition). Thus, there
were four types of experimental blocks: contradictory self, non-
contradictory self, contradictory other, and non-contradictory
other. At the beginning of each block, a 22.6◦ × 2.7◦ cue sentence
describing the current judgment task (self vs. other; e.g., ‘Please
judge whether the words presented can describe yourself ’) was
presented for 2 s indicating the judgment target, followed by four
experimental trials. On each trial, a pair of traits of 5.6◦ × 1.6◦
was simultaneously presented bilaterally for 2 s, followed by two
consecutive 2 s response windows during which time participants
had to respond to each of the traits, respectively. In each response
display, a cue sentence describing the current response task (e.g.,
‘Please judge whether the left word can describe yourself ’) of
22.6◦ × 2.7◦ was presented in the center of the screen and
the participant pressed the one of two keys to make a yes/no
judgment. Each experimental condition was repeated four times
in a scan and the order of conditions was counter-balanced
using a Latin Square design. Five 26 s ﬁxation periods were
inserted after every four blocks, as well as at the beginning and
end of a scan. Two scans of 537.5 s were obtained from each
participant.
After the scan session, participants completed DSS (Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2004) which is a widely used self-report measure
of dispositional naïve dialecticism with adequate psychometric
properties. DSS uses a 7-point Likert-like scale with 1 = Strongly
Disagree and 7= Strongly Agree for 32 items (e.g., ‘Myworld is full
of contradictions that cannot be resolved.’). For the current study,
DSS’s Cronbach’s α coeﬃcient was 0.73, indicating adequate
reliability.
Image Acquisition
Imaging data were acquired at the Center of Bio-Medical Imaging
Research (CBIR), Tsinghua University. A Philips Achieva 3.0T
TX system with a standard 8-channel head coil was used to
acquire T2-wighted echo-planar images (EPI) blood oxygenated
level dependent (BOLD) contrast. Forty transverse slices were
acquired with 3 mm thickness with a plane resolution of
2.5 mm × 2.5 mm. We used a 2500 ms slice repetition time,
90◦ ﬂip angle, and 35 ms echo time. The slices covered the most
of the brain excepted for the inferior parts of the cerebellum.
A High-resolution T1-weighted image was also acquired for each
participant with 160 contiguous sagittal slices of 1 mm thickness
and 8◦ ﬂip angle. Time of repetition was 8.2 s and time of echo
was 3.8 ms. The acquisition matrix was 256 mm × 256 mm with
voxel size of 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm.
Data Analysis
SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London,
UK; www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) was used for data analysis.
Preprocessing
The functional images were realigned to the ﬁrst scan to
correct for head movement, spatially realigned and unwrapped
to correct for interactions between movement artifacts and
ﬁeld inhomogeneities, and slice-timed. The six estimated
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movement parameters were used as covariates in the subsequent
individual-level statistical analysis. Adjusted functional images
were co-registered with structural images, and structural images
were segmented into diﬀerent tissue types, the outputs of
which were normalized to MNI space using the DARTEL
algorithm implemented in SPM8 to increase the accuracy
of inter-subject alignment (voxel-size was transformed to
1.5 mm × 1.5 mm × 1.5 mm in this step). Finally, the
normalized images were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of
8 mm.
Definition of dACC Region of Interest (ROI)
We deﬁned an anatomical ROI of the bilateral dACC with WFU
Pickatlas toolbox (Maldjian et al., 2003) using the procedure
described recently (Cascio et al., 2015), by ﬁrstly creating the
union of Brodmann areas 24 and 32, as well as AAL masks of
anterior, middle, and posterior cingulate (all dilated to 2 mm),
then subtracting Brodmann areas 8 and 9 from this union, and
ﬁnally restricting this ROI to a bounding box of [x = –16 to 16,
y = 0 to 33, and z = 6 to 52].
We created contrasts for each of the four experimental
conditions (with two variables: judgment type – self vs. other;
trait type – contradictory vs. non-contradictory) at the individual
level. These contrast images were then submitted to a group-
level voxel-based 2 × 2 repeated-measure ANOVA within the
dACC ROI. A gray matter mask was created by binarizing SPM’s
prior probability gray matter map at a threshold of 0.2, and this
was applied in this and all of the following group-level analyses.
Statistical maps were thresholded at puncorr < 0.005 and the
issue of multiple comparisons was addressed with a small-volume
corrected threshold of pFWE < 0.05. Furthermore, clusters
passing a more liberal cluster-level threshold of puncorr < 0.05
were reported as trending results.
Correlational Analysis
To test the hypothesis that dACC’s activity in the processing
of self-related contradiction was modulated by the dispositional
naive dialecticism, we conducted correlational analysis between
the DSS score and brain activity. Contrasts reﬂecting the
interaction between contradiction and the self [contradictory
(self – other) – non-contradictory (self – other)] were created
for each participant, and signal intensity in these images was
submitted to a group-level regression model within the dACC
ROI, with DSS score as a predictor and gender and age as
covariates of no interest. Statistical maps were thresholded at
puncorr < 0.005 and multiple comparisons were addressed with a
small-volume corrected threshold of pFWE < 0.05. Furthermore,
clusters passing a more liberal cluster-level threshold of
puncorr < 0.05 were reported as trends.
Exploratory Whole-Brain Analysis
To verify the results in the ROI analyses, univariate whole
brain analyses were conducted. We performed the 2 × 2
repeated-measures ANOVA (judgment type – self vs. other; trait
type – contradictory vs. non-contradictory) and correlational
analysis within the whole-brain, using a voxel-wise threshold
of puncorr < 0.005, combined with a cluster-level threshold of
pFWE < 0.05. Furthermore, clusters passing a more liberal cluster-
level threshold of puncorr < 0.05 were reported as trends.
Psychophysiological Interactions (PPI) Analysis
To further explore the dACC’s changes in functional connectivity
with other regions during the processing of self-related
contradiction, a PPI analysis was conducted (Friston et al., 1997).
The ROI was deﬁned as a sphere with 3 mm radius centered at
the peak coordinate [–12 31.5 27] in the dACC identiﬁed from
the above analyses. Time series of the ROI were extracted, and
the PPI regressor was calculated as the scalar product of the
time-course of activity in the seed region and the task time-
course of [contradictory (self – other) – non-contradictory (self –
other)]. The individual-level contrast images were subjected to
a group-level one-sample t-test, and the modulatory role of
the DSS score was examined with a multiple regression model
controlling for participants’ gender and age. Statistical maps
were thresholded at puncorr < 0.005 and a cluster-level threshold
was set at pFWE < 0.05. Furthermore, clusters passing a more
liberal cluster-level threshold of puncorr < 0.05 were reported as
trends.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Participants made valid responses (i.e., made a response within
the time window) on 94.4% of the trials during the encoding
phase. To assess the eﬀect of dialectical self-referential thinking,
the ratio of double-‘yes’ trial (i.e., ratio of participant made
‘yes’ responses to both of the traits) was subjected to a 2
(judgment: self vs. other) × 2 (trait type: contradictory vs. non-
contradictory) repeated measures ANOVA (see Table 1). The
analysis yielded a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of judgment target,
F(1,26) = 8.06, p = 0.01; participants made more double-
‘yes’ responses on self- relative to other-referential judgment
trials. The main eﬀect of trait type was also signiﬁcant,
F(1,26) = 111.75, p < 0.01; participants made more double-
‘yes’ responses on non-contradictory relative to contradictory
trials. The interaction between these two factors was marginally
signiﬁcant, F(1,26) = 3.26, p = 0.08; Simple main eﬀect
analysis showed that, while the percentage of double-‘yes’
responses decreased signiﬁcantly from non-contradictory trials
to contradictory trials for both judgment target (ps < 0.01),
the reduction was greater for the self-judgment, indicating
that participants were more reluctant to attribute conﬂicting
adjectives to self than other target. Correlational analyzes showed
that DSS score was not signiﬁcantly correlated with double-‘yes’
TABLE 1 | Percentage of double-‘yes’ response in the behavioral task.
Self Other
Contradictory 10.45% 6.19%
±15.13% ±5.89%
Non-contradictory 35.88% 27.80%
±14.64% ±11.93%
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rate in any condition (|r| s < 0.15, ps > 0.44), nor with the
interaction eﬀect (r = –0.05, p = 0.81).
fMRI Results
ROI Analyses
A cluster covering the bilateral dACC ﬁrst was identiﬁed.
The ANOVAs with judgment (self vs. other) and type of
trait (contradictory vs. non-contradictory) demonstrated a
signiﬁcant main eﬀect of self > other, k = 2587, pFWE < 0.01,
peaking at [0 31.5 16.5], Z = 4.90. No suprathreshold
cluster was found for the main eﬀect of type of trait; there
was no greater activity involved in contradictory relative
to non-contradictory condition. We also did not observe a
signiﬁcant interaction between judgment and type of trait
[contradictory (self – other) > non-contradictory (self – other)],
indicating that the dACC was not especially engaged during the
processing of self-related conﬂicting information in the whole
sample.
However, there was a signiﬁcant positive correlation between
the relative degree of activity of dACC during the processing
of self-relevant information and the DSS score, k = 309,
pFWE < 0.01, peaking at [–12 31.5 27], Z = 4.22 (Figure 1A).
The result indicated that the engagement of the dACC in the
processing of self-related conﬂicting information was modulated
by participants’ subjective dispositional level of dialectical
thinking; the correlation coeﬃcient between the cluster’s mean
relative activation and the DSS score was r = 0.71, p < 0.01
(Figure 1B). Furthermore, to measure whether the strength of
the DSS score modulated the strength of activity in dACC,
participants were split into two groups using the mean DSS
scores (the mean score for the high (n = 13) and low
groups (n = 14) were 4.57 and 3.91, respectively). A mixed
ANCOVA with three variables – trait type (contradictory
vs. non-contradictory) × judgment (self vs. other) × DSS
level (high vs. low), for gender and age, was conducted. We
extracted the cluster’s mean activation in each condition using
MarsBar 0.43 (Brett et al., 2002). The analyses showed a
signiﬁcant three-way interaction, F(1,23) = 18.42, p < 0.001.
The follow-up analyses revealed that there was enhanced
activity in the non-contradictory self-thinking condition for the
FIGURE 1 | (A) A cluster in left dACC (peaking at [–12 31.5 27]) showed significant positive correlation between its relative activation during the processing of
conflicting information relevant to self and score on Dialectical Self Scale (imposing on participants’ averaged smoothed anatomical images); (B) Scatter plot of the
dACC’s relative activation and DSS score; (C) The dACC’s activation across conditions and DSS levels. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
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low-DSS group; in contrast, there was increased activity in the
contradictory self-thinking condition for the high-DSS group
(Figure 1C).
Univariate Whole-Brain Analyses
As shown in Table 2, a voxel-based ANOVA performed on the
whole brain veriﬁed the ROI results, consistent with prior work
(Zhu et al., 2007), revealing a large cluster covering cortical
midline structures such as the ACC and MPFC, generating a
main eﬀect of self > other, k = 11893, pFWE < 0.01, peaking
at [–3 57 –3], Z = 6.48. Two additional signiﬁcant clusters
were identiﬁed in left caudate and partial area, and trends for
three additional clusters were identiﬁed in the right superior
and middle frontal gyri, the bilateral SMA and SFG, and the
right fusiform gyrus, lingual gyrus, and parahippocampus. The
main eﬀect of contradictory > non-contradictory identiﬁed a
large cluster in the left parietal lobe, k = 6371, pFWE = < 0.01,
peaking at [–31.5 –48 66], Z = 4.64, as well as a trend
for a cluster covering the left middle occipital gyrus. The
contrast reﬂecting the interaction eﬀect of contradictory
(self – other)> non-contradictory (self – other) identiﬁed a cluster
in the left hippocampus and parahippocampus, k = 1134,
pFWE = 0.01, peaking at [–24 –7.5 –24], Z = 4.81. Additionally,
a cluster in the right superior and middle frontal gyrus was
identiﬁed as trending region.
The correlation analysis between the DSS score and relative
activation in the processing of self-related conﬂicting information
extracted from the GLM analysis conﬁrmed the ROI results,
revealing a cluster in dACC, k = 502, pFWE = 0.01, peaking
at [–12 31.5 27], Z = 4.22. No other suprathreshold region or
trending region was identiﬁed.
PPI Results
The PPI analysis (Table 3) revealed a trend in which the
dACC showed decreased functional connectivity with the left
caudate during the processing of conﬂicting information relevant
to self. Furthermore, participants’ DSS scores were positively
correlated with functional connectivity during the processing of
self-related conﬂicting information between the dACC and the
left caudate, the left middle temporal gyrus, and the brainstem
and hippocampus areas, all of which appeared as trends in the
results.
TABLE 2 | Results of voxel-based ANOVA in exploratory whole-brain analysis.
Regions BA k Peak
x y z Z
Self > Other
Bilateral ACC, MPFC, and MFG 9/10/24/32 11893∗∗ –3 57 –3 6.48
Bilateral caudate 1999∗ –18 22.5 9 4.43
Left calcarine, PCC, lingual, precuneus, parahippocampus, hippocampus 18/19/30/31 2190∗∗ –24 –61.5 18 4.40
Right SFG and MFG 10 817† 25.5 57 27 4.26
Bilateral SMA and SFG 6/8 1409† 10.5 18 61.5 3.95
Right fusiform, lingual, and parahippocampus 19 251† 30 –52.5 0 3.85
Contradictory > Non-contradictory
Left IPL, SPL, MFG, SFG, postcentral, and precentral 3/5/6/7/9/40 6371∗∗ –31.5 –48 66 4.64
Left MOG 628† –28.5 –76.5 19.5 3.71
Contradictory (Self – Other) > Non-contradictory (Self – Other)
Left hippocampus and parahippocampus 28 1134∗ –24 –7.5 –24 4.81
Right MPFC, SFG, and MFG 10 684† 12 55.5 19.5 4.74
Left cerebellum and bilateral brain stem 771† –4.5 –46.5 –15 3.63
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; MPFC, medial-prefrontal cortex; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; SOG, superior
occipital gyrus; MOG, middle occipital gyrus; SMA, supplementary motor area; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; SPL, superior parietal lobule; ∗∗pFWE < 0.01, ∗pFWE < 0.05,
†puncorr < 0.05.
TABLE 3 | Results of Psychophysiological Interactions (PPI) analysis.
Regions BA k Peak
x y z Z
Regions with decreased functional connectivity with dACC during the processing of conflicting information relevant to self
Left caudate 249† –16.5 –16.5 24 4.59
Regions whose functional connectivity with dACC during the processing of conflicting information relevant to self are associated with the DSS score
(+) Left caudate 74† –12.5 15 13.5 4.04
(+) Left MTG 21 375† –46.5 –19.5 –10.5 3.60
(+) Left brainstem/hippocampus 237† –7.5 –4.5 –19.5 3.60
MTG, middle temporal gyrus; †puncorr < 0.05.
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DISCUSSION
In the current study, we examined the neural correlates of
dialectical self-thinking by manipulating whether presented
pairs of traits were contradictory or not in a modiﬁed
self-referential thinking paradigm and correlated participants’
brain activity in the task with their dispositional level of
naïve dialecticism. Based on the literature on self-processing
and conﬂict monitoring, we hypothesized that, for chronic
dialectical thinkers, the dACC should play a critical role in
dealing with conﬂicting information in relation to the self.
The results showed that the strength of dACC activation
during the processing of conﬂicting information relevant to
the self was strongly positively correlated with participants’
scores on the DSS. The results are in line with previous
behavioral studies showing that dialectical thinking styles in
various domains are mostly evident in people with high
DSS scores (e.g., English and Chen, 2007; Spencer-Rodgers
et al., 2009, 2004). We extended this behavioral work by
showing that for the chronic dialectical thinkers, the dACC
was more engaged when processing conﬂict information in
relation to the self. It is well known that the engagement
of the ACC has been observed in studies of self-thinking
(e.g., Northoﬀ and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoﬀ et al., 2006;
Zhu et al., 2007), and the eﬀect is maintained even after
controlling for confounding eﬀects of familiarity (Qin et al.,
2012). On the other hand, the dACC has been reported to
play a crucial role in conﬂict-monitoring (Botvinick et al.,
2004; Carter and van Veen, 2007). Since dialectical self-
thinking is a speciﬁc form of self-processing that deals with
conﬂicting information relevant to self, the enhanced activity
in the dACC in dialectical self-thinking may reﬂect more
eﬃcient monitoring and processing of self-related information
compared with information relating to other under conditions of
contradiction.
All of our participants were Chinese, who are supposed
to be more likely to be dialectical thinkers (Peng and
Nisbett, 1999), hence one might expect that there should
also be an overall interaction eﬀect between judgment target
and trait type on dACC’s activity regardless of the DSS
score. However, previous research has shown that there are
considerable and meaningful individual diﬀerences in naïve
dialecticism even within a single culture (Spencer-Rodgers
et al., 2004, 2009; English and Chen, 2007; Boucher et al.,
2009), and in our study the DSS score of the low DSS
group (M = 3.91) was, in fact, closer to the results for
Western participants in previous research (M = 3.87, Hamamura
et al., 2008). Since dialectical self-thinking, by its deﬁnition,
should only occur with individuals possessing a dialectical
thinking style, it is not surprising that our diverse sample
did not show an overall signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect in the
dACC.
A closer look into the DSS’s positive correlation with the
dACC’s relative activation in self-related conﬂict-processing,
however, revealed an unexpected eﬀect: for the low DSS
group: The dACC showed enhanced activity during self-
vs. other-referential processing on non-contradictory trials.
The non-contradictory condition served as a baseline in the
current study and was essentially a classical self-referential
task. Therefore, it is possible that this eﬀect reﬂects a more
general self-referential process. As participants’ dispositional
level of naïve dialecticism increased, the dACC’s function might
shift from general self-processing to a more specialized role
in dealing with conﬂicting aspects of the self. However, this
explanation is highly speculative and needs to be tested in future
research.
Another unexpected result was the lack of DSS correlation
at behavioral level. While previous studies showed that a higher
score on DSS is associated with more dialectical ratings to
contradictory adjective pairs (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004, 2009),
such positive correlations were not observed in the current study.
This inconsistency might be attributed to the simpliﬁed ‘yes’–
‘no’ response employed in the current study. While dialectical
thinkers are more likely to feel that contradictory adjectives
may simultaneously describe themselves, due to dialecticism’s
emphasis on ﬁnding the middle ground, they are also less liable
to choose an extreme response on a rating scale (e.g., choose 5
or 6 instead of 7 on a 7-point Likert-like scale; Hamamura et al.,
2008). A ‘yes’–‘no’ response might be just not sensitive enough to
capture dialectical responses. Future studies could try to employ
Likert-like rating scales to measure dialectical self-thinking at
behavioral level.
The view of dACC’s critical role in dialectical self-thinking is
also consistent with the results in the PPI analysis. For the chronic
dialectical thinkers, when dealing with conﬂicting information
relevant to self, there was increased functional connectivity
between the dACC and a number of self-related regions,
including the caudate, which has been linked with processing
of self-relevant information as well as reward (e.g., Enzi et al.,
2009), and themiddle temporal gyrus, which has been linked with
context-dependent retrieval of episodic memory (e.g., Tsukiura
et al., 2002) and self-referential processing (e.g., Yoshimura
et al., 2009). These results may reﬂect the use of the dACC by
dialectical thinkers in modulating and resolving contradiction
in self-processing, enhancing its functional connectivity with
other self-processing regions. However, it should be noted that
these regions showed only signiﬁcant trends, and more studies
are needed to verify them. Overall, this study provides the ﬁrst
evidence that the dACC is engaged in dialectical thinking in the
domain of self. Additional theoretical and empirical studies could
try to elaborate the dACC’s role in dialectical self-processing (e.g.,
monitoring, resolution, or integration of conﬂicting self-related
information) and delineate the underlying neural network.
Beyond the results in the dACC, exploratory whole-
brain analysis further identiﬁed the left hippocampus and
parahippocampus as being engaged during the processing of
conﬂicting information relevant to self regardless of participants’
dispositional tendency to think dialectically. These regions
are well known as key areas in an autobiographical memory
(AM) network (Svoboda et al., 2006; Addis et al., 2012). The
engagement of these regions may reﬂect participants’ eﬀort in
retrieving autobiographical memories in relation to personality
traits during self-referential judgments, but further work is
required to verify this.
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Although our sample was relatively distributed on the level
of dispositional dialectical thinking, they were still from a single
culture and shared the same cultural and societal environment.
Since most existing ﬁndings regarding dialectical thinking come
from cross-cultural studies, it would also be interesting to
replicate the current study in a cross-cultural comparison
between East-Asian and Western participants to see if activity
in the dACC does indeed underlie the cultural diﬀerences in
dialectical thinking. In addition, the tendency of participants to
think dialectically can be temporarily altered through priming
(e.g., Ma-Kellams et al., 2011, Study 3), to make a stronger
causal inference based on this intervention. It is expected
that the enhanced activity in the dACC during the processing
of self-related conﬂicting information should be particularly
pronounced for those primed with a dialectical mindset.
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